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Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation:  Making the Rules, Vol. 1, and Resolving Disputes, 
Vol 2, by Charan Devereaux, Robert Lawrence, and Michael D. Watkins.  (Peter G. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics 2006) are outstanding contributions that 
provide a magnificent depth of understanding of how U.S. trade policies and related 
initiatives are designed, negotiated, and implemented and how issues of dispute 
settlement of concern to the United States in the World Trade Organization (WTO) have 




Volume 1, Making the Rules, covers:  trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS); the multilateral agreement on investment (MAI); fast track/trade promotion 
authority; the 1999 US-China bilateral agreement and the battle for permanent normal 
trade relations (PNTR); and the US-EU Mutual Recognition Agreements.  The dispute 
settlement cases in Volume 2, Resolving Disputes, include:  US-EU trade in hormone-
treated beef; the EU banana regime; Kodak v. Fuji; US steel actions; Brazil’s WTO 
cotton case; and the US-EU GMO dispute on agricultural biotechnology. The material in 
the two volumes is organized in the form of case studies developed at the Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government (KSG) and used for instructional 
purposes.   
 
2. Making the Rules 
 
Each of the cases in Volume 1 is preceded by a discussion of the coverage of  trade 
agreements, that is, whether the focus should be narrowly concentrated on trade-related 
issues such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions or be more broadly concentrated on the 
rules governing trade such as investment policy, competition policy, regulatory policies, 
or labor and environmental standards. Also discussed is how deeply trade agreements 
should reach beyond national boundaries and into the domestic economy and whether 
non-discrimination and transparency are to be sought in individual nations or whether 
there should be complete harmonization of policies across countries.  The enforcement of 
trade agreements is another issue of importance that requires rules and procedures for 
resolving inter-country disputes that may arise.  Further, the circumstances of developing 
countries may require special attention in trade agreements as to whether these countries  
may merit special and differential treatment in complying with the provisions of the 
agreements, including preferential trading arrangements.  A final consideration is that 
trade agreements will affect governance domestically as well as relationships between 
countries.  Volume 1 further provides an illuminating conceptual framework designed to 
enhance the understanding of the processes of negotiation and the strategies that the 
parties involved may employ. 
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The cases included in Volume 1 all deal with the policies, politics, and processes used in 
making rules to govern trade.  Following discussion of the different aspects of the 
individual trade agreements just noted, each chapter is organized in a case format that 
traces in detail the background of the issues and the different phases of the negotiating 
process.  What is remarkable about the cases is that they bring to life how the trade 
agreements unfolded politically in terms of the role of the different interest groups and 
government authorities.  This is done based on personal interviews of key actors and 
documentation of the negotiating process based to a large extent on news reports and 
published statements of government officials and major stakeholders.  Each chapter’s 
case concludes with a negotiation analysis based on the conceptual framework of the 
negotiation processes and strategies referred to above. What then can be learned from the 
individual cases presented?   
 
2.1 The TRIPS Agreement 
 
The TRIPS agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations (1986-94) with the intensive lobbying efforts especially by U.S. 
multinational firms in the pharmaceutical, software, and entertainment industries.  The 
TRIPS agreement was designed to protect intellectual property rights primarily for the 
benefit of the advanced countries and possibly to the detriment of low-income developing 
countries.  The TRIPS agreement was therefore a major departure from the principles of 
trade liberalization based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
TRIPS caused a backlash as concerns were raised that low-income developing countries 
would be unable to afford the essential medicines needed to treat such endemic diseases 
as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.  This led to negotiation of special measures at 
the 2001 WTO ministerial meeting in Doha and subsequently to help low-income 
countries obtain access to medicines. 
 
2.2 Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
 
As mentioned, the GATT system was focused on the reduction and removal of trade 
barriers.  While an agreement on trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) had been 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round, it is noteworthy that there were no multilateral 
rules or agreements covering foreign direct investment (FDI) more broadly.  An effort 
was made therefore to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) under the 
auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
What is noteworthy is that the OECD consists largely of high-income countries and is 
primarily an advisory body without enforcement powers.  The idea was that if the OECD 
members could agree on the principles of an MAI, developing countries could then be 
induced to join.  It turned out however that there was widespread opposition to an MAI 
by a large number of non-governmental organizations and many developing countries.  
Also, some high-income countries backed away from the MAI when they realized that 
some of its investment provisions might be a significant intrusion on their national 
sovereignty.  As a consequence, many countries have negotiated bilateral investment 
treaties that deal with important issues and represent less of a threat to sovereignty. 
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2.3 Fast track/Trade Promotion  
 
Fast track/trade promotion authority has been a cornerstone of U.S. trade negotiations 
since 1974.  The president is given authority to negotiate trade agreements, and the 
Congress can only vote yes-or-no without any amendments or changes once an 
agreement has been submitted.  This authority grew out of a situation in which the 
Congress opposed some of the concessions that had been negotiated in the Kennedy 
Round of GATT negotiations in the 1960s and mandated some changes to be made. As a 
result, it became clear that other countries would not enter into trade negotiations with the 
United States if there was some likelihood that the U.S. Congress were able to withdraw 
or revise the negotiations.  Congressional opposition to fast track authority was built up 
in the early1990s when the United States entered into negotiations with Mexico and 
Canada for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  There was a fear that 
U.S. workers would be displaced by low-wage Mexican workers.  It was only when 
President Clinton opted to negotiate side agreements on labor and the environment that 
the NAFTA was approved by a very small margin in the Congress in 1994.  Afterwards, 
the fast track authority lapsed, and it was restored only in 2002 and renamed trade 
promotion authority at a time when the Bush Administration had majorities in both 
houses of Congress.  It is noteworthy that the president’s trade promotion authority 
expired on June 30, 2007, and there is a question of when and under what conditions it 
might be revived with the Democrats in the majority in the Congress and with a 
Democrat possibly elected as president in November 2008. 
 
2.4 China’s WTO Accession and Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
 
China became a member of the WTO in December 2001.  Although China was not 
previously a member of the WTO, the United States had granted it most-favored-nation 
(MFN) trade status in 1979, thus enabling China to avoid having to pay the much higher 
U.S. import duties that dated back to the 1930s.  Nonetheless, U.S. law mandated an 
annual Congressional review of China’s trade status, and this provided Congress an 
opportunity to call attention to alleged human rights abuses in China, to express concern 
over national security vis-à-vis China and its policies towards Taiwan, and to criticize 
China’s policies that were allegedly responsible for the U.S. bilateral trade deficit.  Since 
China was in any case to become a WTO member, the issue was that the United States 
had to give up its annual review and to grant China permanent normal trade relations 
(PNTR).  It was only with a vigorous public relations campaign by the Clinton 
Administration and the support of the U.S. business community that enough votes were 
obtained to support PNTR for China and overcome the opposition of some members of 
Congress and organized labor.   
 
The controversy over granting PNTR to China is pertinent to the present situation 
regarding Russia’s accession to WTO membership.  As in the case of China, the United 
States has granted MFN status to Russia.  But Russia technically remains subject to a U.S. 
Cold War trade provision known as Jackson-Vanik, which links the trade status of many 
communist or formerly communist countries to their human rights and emigration 
policies. As a fellow WTO member, the United States would therefore be required to lift 
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that provision and permanently provide Russia the same degree of market access it 
provides every other WTO member.  PNTR for Russia has been held up for some years 
as Russia has been accused of numerous violations of intellectual property rights and the 
failure to apply effective science-based sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures for a 
number of agricultural products.   Criticisms have also been made of Russia’s industrial 
subsidies and pricing of energy products.  While bilateral negotiations have been 
underway for some time on these issues, the granting of PNTR to Russia has yet to be 
addressed by the U.S. Congress.  It is likely accordingly that there will be considerable 
discussion and debate on the issues in the near future, and it will remain for a post-Bush 
administration to decide whether and how PNTR is to be supported politically with 
respect to Russia. 
 
2.5 US/EU Mutual Recognition Agreements 
 
The US-EU mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) refer to agreements covering 
bilateral inspection, testing, and certification for a variety of traded products, including 
medical devices, pharmaceuticals, recreational craft, telecommunications, 
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) services, and electrical equipment.  Negotiations on 
MRAs, which were completed in 1998, were designed to eliminate red tape and 
duplication of product testing and standardization with the objective of lowering costs for 
the sectors involved.  What is interesting about MRAs is that their negotiation took place 
outside of the WTO and involved national regulatory agencies as well as or in lieu of 
trade agencies.  It was also the case that representatives from business firms played 
important roles in the negotiations under the auspices of the Transatlantic Business 
Dialog (TABD).  The negotiation of MRAs was thus decidedly different than negotiating 
changes in tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  Much can be learned from this case therefore 
that may prove useful in the current EU-US trans-Atlantic negotiations that were 
launched in 2007 with the support of the German Prime Minister, Angela Merkel.  
Sectoral agreements to be negotiated include automobiles, financial markets, anti-
trust/competition law, chemicals, accounting, and pharmaceuticals. 
 
The cases in Volume 1 thus cover a variety of interesting and important negotiations on 
trade and related agreements.  These cases provide useful insights and understanding of 
the economic and political complexities of the important issues involved and are 
therefore of great value to trade specialists.  They may also provide a template for related 
negotiations that are now in progress or that will begin in the near future. 
 
3. Resolving Disputes 
 
With the advent of the WTO in January 1995, a new system for resolving disputes was 
created.  It was designed to strengthen the system and to facilitate its operation by 
imposing time lines and procedures for the presentation, adjudication, and settlement of 
cases.  The introductory chapter summarizes the six cases of dispute settlement to be 
covered and presents a brief and informative survey of the GATT system and the 
foundation of the WTO during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
(1986-94).  It then analyzes the structural, political, and psychological barriers that may 
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arise in negotiating the resolution of disputes and the design of alternative dispute 
resolution systems.  A contrast is drawn between the GATT system of dispute resolution 
in which diplomacy played a central role and the WTO system that is much more 
formalized and based on principles of jurisprudence.  Some important features of the 
WTO system include the role of precedents in adjudicating cases, the discretion that some 
countries exercise in complying with rulings, the limits placed on private counsel in 
presenting cases, and the inability to force compliance with rulings.  It is also noted that 
countries may seek to “game” the system by intentionally breaching their WTO 
commitments for domestic political reasons by delaying the implementation of new 
legislation or the introduction of  adjustment-assistance programs.  There may also be 
cases in which the objective is to challenge ambiguous trade rules and policies.  Finally, 
for strategic reasons, WTO member countries may form coalitions in bringing cases.  
 
Each case presented is prefaced by a discussion of the historical context of the dispute 
involved and the events leading up to the filing of the official dispute in the WTO.  At the 
end of each chapter, there is an analysis that summarizes the main features and outcome 
of the case. 
 
3.1 Hormone-Treated Beef 
 
The case of hormone-treated beef had its origin in the EU ban on beef using growth-
promoting hormones, including imports from the United States.  The United States 
viewed the EU action as protectionist and designed to protect the EU beef market by 
unsupported scientific claims about the detrimental health effects on consumers.  For its 
part, the EU argued, according to the precautionary principle, that health issues should be 
decided in response to the interests of its citizens.  The United States filed a formal 
complaint against the EU in April 1996, and its position was later upheld by the WTO on 
the grounds that the EU had violated the WTO sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
agreement.  Nonetheless, the EU chose not to respond, on the grounds that it could 
prohibit or restrict products that were suspected, but not proven to be harmful.  The 
United States then chose to impose sanctions on imports from the EU in the form of 
tariffs on particular products of key interest to some individual EU member countries.  
While the EU has made some changes in policies permitting the use of beef hormones, its 
ban and the U.S. retaliatory tariffs remain in place.  This case thus illustrates the 
difficulty in using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism when health and safety 
concerns are at issue and the parties differ in their assessment of the risks involved. 
 
3.2 The EU Banana Regime 
 
The banana dispute is particularly interesting because it was orchestrated by the Office of 
the US Trade Representative on the initiative of the Chiquita and Dole corporations who 
had major interests in investments in banana production in Central and South America.  
When the EU moved to a Single Market in the early 1990s, it revised its quota regime on 
banana imports to expand the benefit to former colonies in the Africa/Caribbean/Pacific 
(ACP) region to the detriment of bananas produced by the U.S. multinationals and other 
producers not covered by the ACP preferences.  There is evidence that the Chiquita 
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Corporation was deeply involved in influencing the USTR action through the political 
contributions that were made to both political parties.  The United States was joined by 
some other WTO members in this action, and the WTO ruled against the EU quota 
arrangements.  The EU was slow to respond to the unfavorable ruling, and this led the 
United States to impose retaliatory tariffs, which remained in place pending a new system 
of import tariffs that the EU has developed that permits greater imports from producers 
outside the ACP grouping.  What is striking about this case is that the United States has 
virtually no domestic production of bananas but was nonetheless able to use its influence 
on behalf of some influential U.S. multinational corporations and at the same time to help 
reduce the discriminatory effects of the EU banana import regime. 
 
3.3 Kodak-Fuji Film 
 
The Kodak-Fuji photographic film dispute was initiated in late 1996 by Kodak’s alleged 
difficulties in penetrating the Japanese market in which Fuji had the predominant share.  
At issue was the extent to which the Japanese Fair Trade Commission applied its 
regulations of the domestic market for films to benefit Fuji and to limit the competition of 
foreign competitors like Kodak.  The Kodak case was also based on the claim that there 
were a variety of informal trade barriers that prevented their expansion in the Japanese 
film market.  The WTO later essentially denied all of Kodak’s allegations and ruled in 
favor o Fuji.  The Kodak-Fuji dispute is interesting because it followed along the same 
lines as a number of previous disputes that the United States had pursued vis-à-vis Japan 
on a bilateral basis under existing U.S. law.  That is, under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade 
Act, the United States could bring unilateral actions against trading partners that were 
allegedly harming U.S. commercial.  With the advent of the WTO, such unilateral actions 
were no longer possible since they could now be challenged in the new WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
 
3.4 US Steel Safeguards Tariffs 
 
In March 2002, the Bush Administration imposed safeguards tariffs on some types of 
imported steel.  This was in response to the intense lobbying pressures of the domestic 
steel producers and union representatives to deal with the problems posed by the alleged 
surge of imported steel resulting from the foreign financial crises of the late 1990s.  The 
facts of this case were in dispute, and there was no clear evidence of substantial injury for 
the steel firms and workers involved.  Yet the action was taken even though the Bush 
Administration knew that it would be challenged in the WTO, which turned out to be the 
case as the EU filed an action challenging the U.S. import tariffs.  The rationale for the 
Bush Administration appears to have been that, while WTO-inconsistent, the imposition 
of the safeguards tariffs would buy time for the aid to benefit the U.S. steel producers and 
workers.  This is because of the various steps involved in implementing a dispute 
settlement action.  In any event, the WTO ruled in favor of the EU, and the Bush 
Administration removed the tariffs in the face of potential EU retaliation.  This case thus 
illustrates how a country can “game” the WTO dispute settlement system at least for a 
while, but, in the final analysis the WTO system becomes effective. 
 7
3.5 Brazilian Cotton 
Brazil brought a case against the United States in September 2002 challenging the U.S. 
agricultural subsidies on cotton that allegedly reduced the world price 
considerably.  Drawing a line between subsidies that may be “trade distorting” and other 
subsidies is one of the most vexed issues in international trade relations. There is greatest 
agreement on direct export subsidies, which are widely seen to be a form of reverse tariff. 
They are prohibited on manufactures and, since the Uruguay Round, they are seen as 
negotiable concessions on agricultural products.  In agricultural trade, the attempt was 
made during the Uruguay Round to distinguish between subsidies that were “trade 
distorting” and other subsidies. Since countries agreed to place caps on their 
subsidization of exports and other actionable subsidies, the classification of subsidies into 
the different categories became operationally important. The dispute about cotton 
subsidies reveals where the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) draws this particular 
line. 
The DSB found that certain U.S. domestic cotton support programs could be considered 
as subsidies that might violate commitments under WTO Agreements. One such program 
consisted of direct payments to farmers, although these were not related to prices or 
production. The DSB, however, noted that payments were conditional on farmers not 
growing certain alternative crops (and it thus interfered with market signals). Counter- 
cyclical payments to farmers were another such program: these had been introduced in 
the late 1990s when world cotton prices fell heavily. They were intended as a form of 
income support, but the DSB ruled that they were an actionable subsidy because the base 
price in the program was high in relation to world prices.  
The reasoning of the DSB in the cotton case appears applicable to several other crops of 
major exporting countries, particularly the United States. Thus, the DSB rulings could 
place significant restrictions on the domestic agricultural programs that major exporters 
are able to pursue while remaining compliant with WTO Agreements.  It seems very 
probable that these restrictions are greater than what countries assumed at the time that 
they negotiated the Agreements.  It is also true, however, that at least in the case of U.S 
cotton, the problem stems partially from a shift in U.S. domestic agricultural policy since 
the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations. This was evident in the 2002 Farm Bill, 
which formally incorporated a partial reversion to price support programs.  
The broader issue is that the rulings of the DSB may, in the eyes of many, upset the 
balance of concessions and obligations that countries agreed to in the Uruguay Round. 
Rulings that are perceived to alter this balance significantly strike at the principle of 
reciprocity on which trade negotiations depend.  It could be said that the DSB has tended 
to hand down rulings that are on the side of the economic angels, not on the side of the 
political realists who actually negotiated the Agreements. What appeared to guide the 
DSB in deciding whether or not disputes were trade distorting was a model of a freely 
competitive market.  Not for the first time, however, this model sometimes clashed with 
the political realities that negotiators had to contend with in formulating multilateral trade 
agreements.      
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Brazil also brought a case on sugar against the EU.  Both the sugar and cotton cases were 
brought by Brazil as part of a strategy to press the EU and the US to reform their 
agricultural policies in the context of the Doha Round negotiations.  The EU, which was 
in the process of reforming its sugar regime, stated that it would comply with the 
recommendations of the DSB.  In the case of cotton, the DSB authorized Brazil to take 
retaliatory action against the US for failure to comply with major parts of its 
recommendations.  However, in agreement with the US, Brazil suspended action, 
pending the outcome of the Doha Round negotiations.    
The Brazil cotton and sugar rulings seem to take the DSB beyond its proper function, 
which is to preserve and protect the balance of concessions and the supporting rules 
governing agricultural policies that had been negotiated among members in the Uruguay 
Round.  It will be interesting therefore to see what future dispute settlement actions 
agricultural producing countries might take and how the United States and other 
developed countries may be required to make changes in their domestic agricultural 
support programs. 
3.6 Genetically Modified Crops 
Beginning especially in the 1990s, the production of genetically modified (GM) crops, 
particularly corn and soybeans, was greatly expanded in the United States.  The U.S. 
regulatory system did not distinguish between GM and non-GM crops.  But this was not 
the case in the EU in which a separate regulatory approach for GM crops was adopted 
and a moratorium was placed on new GM products in 1998 to the apparent detriment of 
U.S. exporters.  As a consequence, the U.S. brought an action against the EU on the 
grounds that the EU had violated the WTO sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement 
that had been negotiated during theUruguay Round and that required that the 
determination of risk for designated products should be science based.  The WTO upheld 
the U.S. position in early 2006.  But the EU position is that it can use the precautionary 
principle to safeguard the health of its consuming public, pending additional and more 
authoritative research.  The issue here thus parallels the beef-hormone case noted above 
with regard to the differences between the U.S. and EU regulatory policies on food 
products.  
3.7 Issues of Fairness in WTO Dispute Settlement1 
The multilateral system of agreements that governs trade relations among the member 
countries of the WTO rests mainly on recognition of mutual advantage. The agreements 
overcome the Prisoner’s Dilemma that faces states in their relations with each other. 
States enter into the agreements because they trust that others will also comply with their 
terms. This implies that states regard the system of agreements as broadly fair; otherwise, 
they would have an incentive not to comply. Of course, in relations between the strong 
and the weak, the exercise of power may also be influential in inducing the weak to 
comply. Both cooperation for mutual advantage and the exercise of hegemonic power are 
thus at work. 
                                                 
1The discussion that follows is adapted from Brown and Stern (2007)  
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The perception of fairness evidently plays some role in sustaining the trading system, and 
it is this role that accords such importance to the dispute settlement process. It is not only 
that the process provides a channel through which irksome disputes between individual 
countries may be resolved.  Of much broader importance is the fact that, over time, the 
process of dispute settlement may either confirm or diminish members’ confidence that 
the system as a whole is functioning as it should. It may or may not reassure countries 
that the mutually advantageous arrangements to which they have subscribed remain fully 
respected.  
This places a heavy burden on the Dispute Settlement Body, its Panels and Appellate 
Board. They are expected to become the repository of what members collectively believe 
to be the norms and rules of the system; their envisaged duty is to interpret  the collective 
view of what is fair as embodied in the agreements that member countries have 
negotiated and agreed to. It is one condition that the process itself should be seen to be 
fair: the adjudicators in the process should act impartially, not favoring one country over 
another; and the parties to a dispute should have equal opportunity to present their cases. 
Much more difficult to fulfill, however, is the obligation of the Body to interpret and 
apply the agreements of the WTO fairly in all cases. 
Most of the agreements of the WTO spell out the obligations of the member states in 
considerable detail. They identify criteria by which to assess whether a particular 
measure of a member is in compliance with the agreement or constitutes a violation. For 
example, the Subsides and Countervailing Measures Agreement notes that, for a subsidy 
to be in violation of the Agreement, it must be specific, be a financial contribution, confer 
a benefit, derive from a government or its agencies, and cause material injury to the 
industry of the complainant country or serious prejudice to its interests.  Even when 
carefully crafted, however, the texts of agreements cannot be expected to match all the 
highly specific circumstances found in individual cases. Nor can they indicate all the 
factual evidence that may be necessary to apply the rules to a case. Moreover, inherent in 
the text may be ambiguities in language that allow for different interpretations. Further, 
the particular circumstances surrounding a dispute may not have been envisaged at the 
time when the agreement was drafted, and may thus be only tangentially covered or not 
covered at all. The adjudicators in the process thus exercise considerable discretion in the 
interpretation and application of the agreements. Whether they exercise that power in line 
with the collective view of fairness affects confidence in the trading system as a whole. 
This is in line with game theoretical experiments, like ultimatum games, which show the 
importance of fairness in the context of negotiations. One explanation why fair offers are 
made in the context of negotiations is the expected utility hypothesis: self interested 
proposers make fair offers because they fear that unfair offers will be rejected. In the 
normative hypothesis, proposers make fair offers because they are motivated by concerns 
about acting fairly.  Fairness for them rests on a belief in reciprocity. 
3.8 Strains within the System 
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There appears to be a broadly based consensus among trade economists and lawyers that 
the dispute settlement process has worked quite well since its inception in 1995. This is 
an important indicator of the health of the global trading system as a whole.  It tells us 
that member countries are not only abiding by the DB rulings, but that they are willingly 
conforming to the rules of the WTO system as a whole.  In this sense, the dispute 
settlement process is a cornerstone of the system.  So long as disputes are, for the most 
part, seen to be settled fairly, the system retains the confidence of its members. 
However, there are strains within the dispute settlement process that could constitute 
systemic threats. These have emerged out of the content of some of the disputes or from 
the dispute settlement process itself.  Some of the major sources that have emerged to 
date include:   
-           Interpreting ambiguities in particular WTO agreements, which for example may 
lead to divergent views about fair competition and, especially, where the line should be 
drawn between prohibited or actionable subsidies and other subsidies. 
-         The accommodation of large and unforeseen changes in domestic economic or 
political circumstances through safeguards or anti-dumping 
-         The boundary between national social preferences and WTO rules  
-         Gaming of the dispute settlement process to press for the reform of agreements or to 
delay compliance with DB rulings 
-          Resort to authorized trade sanctions that provoke tit-for-tat reactions and 
unproductively worsen trade relations.  
3.9 Conclusions 
The dispute settlement cases included in Volume 2 provide evidence of the various 
strains to the system.  The beef-hormone and GM products cases show how difficult it 
may be to deal with differences between the EU and US with regard to national social 
preferences and WTO rules.  These cases also demonstrate how the resort to trade 
sanctions may be counter productive and worsen trade relations.  The Kodak-Fuji film 
case raises issues of the interpretation and implementation of competition policies that 
may differ between nations. The banana case reflects the problems in dealing with trade 
preferences as compared to MFN tariff treatment, which is a pillar of the WTO system.  
Finally, the US steel safeguards tariffs and the Brazilian cotton cases are examples of 
how nations may “game” the dispute settlement process. 
There are many additional dispute settlement cases involving WTO members besides 
those chosen to illustrate U.S. experiences in Volume 2 that are of interest and 
importance.  There are fortunately some excellent sources of information on the cases 
available from websites maintained by the WTO (WTO.org), World Bank 
(WorldBank.org), and WorldTradeLaw.net. 
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